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Abstrak 
LNG Loading Berth merupakan salah satu unit utama di PT Arun NGL. Unit ini berfungsi sebagai unit untuk 
mendistribusikan LNG yang telah di proses dan disimpan dalam storage kedalam kapal pengankut LNG. Namun, unit ini 
terkadang terjadi kesalahan pada system, yang dapat mengakibatkan kesalahan fata jika terjadi pada skala besar dan terus 
menerus. Maka di setiap plant diberikan suatu Safety Instrumented System (SIS) atau disebut juga ESD. Dalam SIS 
dipaparkan, bahwa keadaan darurat, Shutdown. 
Tugas Akhir ini di titik beratkan pada analisis verifikasi SIS yang telah ada di PT Arun NGL serta Perancangan 
Safety Instrumented System (SIS) pada unit 68 LNG Loading Berth menggunakan DCS YOKOGAWA CENTUM 3000 
yang terdapat di PT. ARUN NGL. Dengan berdasarkan spesifikasi serta sensor  yang digunakan. System ini dapat 
mencegah terjadinya keadaan yang dapat mengakibatkan kerusakan pada system. 
Tingkat pengujian system didasarkan pada ketepatan tindakan yang dilakukan system terhadap instruksi yang 
diberikan oleh user, ataupun secara otomatis oleh sensor. Pengujian juga dilakukan melalui virtual DCS YOKOGAWA 
CENTUM 3000. Diharapkan dengan penelitian SIS pada unit 68 ini dapat bekerja dengan baik serta menjadikan feedback 
bagi PT Arun NGL serta dapat meminimalisir kerusakan pada system. 
Kata Kunci: SIS, SIF, SIL, Safety Life Cycle, BPCS & IEC 
. 
Abstract 
Loading Berth LNG is one of the main units in the PT Arun NGL. This unit serves as a unit for distributing LNG 
that has been processed and stored in a storage vessel into LNG carrier. However, this unit is sometimes an error occurs in 
the system, which can lead to fatal errors if it occurs in large-scale and continuous. Then at each plant is given a safety 
instrumented system (SIS) or also known as ESD. In the SIS presented, that a state of emergency, Shutdown. 
This final project study emphasized on the analysis of the existing SIS verification in PT Arun NGL and Design 
of Safety instrumented system (SIS) in units of 68 LNG Loading Berth use DCS YOKOGAWA CENTUM 3000 
contained in the PT. ARUN NGL. On the basis of the specification and the sensor used. This system can prevent the 
occurrence of circumstances that may cause damage to the system. 
Level testing system based on the accuracy of the system action taken against the instructions given by the user, 
or automatically by the sensor. Testing is also done through virtual CENTUM DCS 3000. It is expected that with the SIS 
research on this 68 unit can work well and make feedback for PT Arun NGL and can minimize damage to the system. 
Keywords: SIS, SIF, SIL, Safety Life Cycle, BPCS & IEC 
 
1.         INTRODUCTION 
PT Arun NGL as one of the international companies are always determined to respond to any existing technology 
advances. One way is to establish cooperation with Yokogawa Electric Hokushin Japan of Japan in the field of control 
technology by using the Distributed Control System for plant control system in PT Arun NGL. Distributed Control 
System is a computer-based control technology and electronic data communications. PT Arun NGL is currently using 
one of the latest Distributed Control System with the type of CENTUM CS 3000 as part of the control system of PT 
Arun NGL plant. 
Safety instrumented system (SIS) play an important role in providing a protective layer in the process industry 
system to suppress the possibility of these risks become smaller. What is the SIS, emergency or safety system shutdown, 
or a safety interlock, the goal is to continue the process to the "safe state" when pre determinated set point has been 
exceeded or when a safe operating condition has been violated 
Emergency Shut Down or ESD, another name of the SIS, is a system that serves to prevent or minimize a result of 
emergency situations, help prevent loss of life, damage to environment, and / or damage to the instrument. This system 
should be designed in such a way as to take into account various possible accidents that may occur either because the 
process trip, equipment failure, human error, or any other cause which is unknown to minimize the damage and losses 
incurred. ESD has a wide range of applications, from private cars to industrial plant.
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The use of Distributed Control System applied to improve the productivity and efficiency of the company also 
increased security in the enterprise, both employee safety and security of the plant unit. One of the important unit in the 
PT Arun NGL plant is LNG Loading Berth (unit 68). If there are problems in the unit 68, it will have fatal consequences. 
In this final project, research will be carried Design Safety instrumented system (SIS) in LNG Loading Berth unit 68 PT 
Arun NGL plant and its application in the Distributed Control System. 
 
2.    Basic Theory 
 
2.1       Safety Instrumented System (SIS) 
 
Safety instrumented system (SIS) or also called ESD system, FNG system or many other naming play an 
important role in providing a protective layer in industrial process systems. Mentioned in the SIS, that a state of 
emergency or safety system shutdown, or a safety interlock, the goal is to continue the process to the "safe state" when pre 
determinated set point has been exceeded or when a safe operating condition has been violated. SIS serves to protect if 
there are unexpected events that cause fatal accidents, environmental pollution, and accidents in an industrial process 
instrumentation. 
Safety instrumented system is designed and constructed to reduce the risk of accidents to a process control that 
can threaten the safety of human life and the environment. This system is not a system that guarantees regular control 
how the process can be run as desired process design engineer, but ensures safety as designed by Process Safety 
Engineer, the system will work when the alarm signal sent by the field devices showed a critical condition. 
 
 
FIgure 2.1 Element at SIS 
 
 
 
2.2       Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as the relative level of risk reduction provided by the security functions 
of an  instrument and process tool, or to determine the level of risk reduction targets.  In simple terms, SIL is a 
measurement of performance required for the safety instrumented system (SIF). Requirements for a given SIL is not 
consistent among all the functional safety standards. SIL itself is the target figure for the PFD (probability of failure on 
demand) of a SIF (safety instrumented function). The higher the value the higher the SIL availability of its safety function 
(easy: the better). There are four degrees SIL standards mentioned in the standards (SIL1, SIL 2, SIL 3, and SIL 
4). Standard standard mentioned above provide a framework to carry out the determination of SIL in general. 
Each mode has its own sense and has its own standards. Low Demand Mode as defined in 3.5.12 of IEC 61508- 
4, is where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and 
no greater than twice the proof test frequency. 
Tabel 2.1 Tabel Low Demand Mode 
 
 
The International Electrotechnical Commission's (IEC) standard IEC 61508, EN 61508 or IEC name for now, 
defines SIL grouped into two major categories of hardware safety integrity and systematic safety integrity. A device or 
system must meet the requirements for both categories to achieve a given SIL level is assigned after Integerity Safety 
Hazard Anayisis Process (AHP) has concluded that the safety instrumented system is required. A PHA performed to 
identify potential hazards in the plant. Analysis of PHA range from very simple screening analysis for Hazard and 
Operability Study (HAZOP). HAZOP itself is systematic, methodical examination of the design process that utilizes a 
multi-disciplinary team to identify hazards or operating problems that can lead to accidents. HAZOP provides a basic 
priority for implementation of risk mitigation strategies, such as emergency shutdown system (ESD).
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2.3       Method to Determine SIL 
 
To calculate the value of SIL using this method, there are several steps that must be done, first of all is to find the value 
PFDavg or PFD-average of a tool, to calculate PFDavg tailored to the architecture of the device. There are the types of 
common architecture that is often used is 1oo1, 1oo2, 1oo3, 2OO2, 2oo3, and so on. From some of the architecture of 
each has a different formula in determining PFDavg, can be seen from the following table: 
 
Tabel 2.2 : PFDavg equation based architecture 
 
 
After doing the calculations on the PFDavg of sebuat tool, we can calculate the value of a SIF SIL. As we know 
that there is a sensor-SIS logic solver-final element. After getting the value PFDavg of a tool, after summing the total 
PFDavg into the formula as the following equation: 
Equation……. (2.1)                          ೄೄݒೄವವೄೄೄ  = Σೄೄݒೄವವೄೄ  + Σೄೄݒೄವವೄ ೄ  + Σೄೄݒೄವವೄೄ 
Where 
Equation……. (2.2)                                                     ೄವವ   =  ವವವ  ݔ  ೄವ 
Meanwhile 
Equation ……. (2.3)                                                    ೄವವ                      
ವೄೄ ೄವೄವ ೄವವವ
 
ವ            ೄವ             ೄವ              ೄವ 
 
From the results of data PFDavg-SIF above we've got the value and match these values into table SIL (table 2.0), 
which has been described previously. 
 
3.    Designing System 
 
3.1          Safety Life Cycle 
 
Safety Life Cycle (SLC) is the engineering process contains the steps required and must be met in order to achieve 
a high level of functional safety in the concept, planning, design, operation, and maintenance of the safety instrumented 
system. An automation system designed according to the requirements SLC is expected to reduce the risk of failure in the 
process industri.Safety Life Cycle begins with the conceptual design of a process and ended only after the SIS is de-
comissioned. The key idea here is that safety must be considered from the beginning of the conceptual process design and 
should be maintained during all the design, operation, and maintenance activities.
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Figure 3.1 Safety Life Cycle Diagram 
 
3.2         Verifikasi Safety Instrumented System Unit 68 
 
Verification on SIS aims to find out what is the value achieved SIL and the SIL value represents the security 
level of the plant, as to which was discussed in the previous chapter on the value of SIL and level of security is achieved, 
the smaller the value of SIL, the greater the risk that would be obtained in the event of a catastrophic vice versa greater the 
value of SIL means the ability to reduce the level of risk, the better. The authors use the appropriate standard of IEC 61 
058 is a method on the Safety of Life Cycle as a guide for verification of SIS. By analyzing the SIL of the SIS is intended 
to determine the value of existing systems, a number of factors into consideration is that existing systems are old systems 
with instrumentation everything is still using the same tool since it was first created. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 System for Verification Value of SIL 
 
4.           Result and Analysis 
 
4.1         SIS Verification – SIL, SIS Value 
 
SIL verification is done by using the Simplified Method, without counting the human factor as the operator's 
participation in this system. The main elements used in the calculation using this method is that the value PFDavg obtained 
from the failure mode for each device. The whole system ESD PT ARUN included into the category of low demand, 
because of the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and 
no greater than twice the proof test frequency for low system demand has qualification separately in accordance with IEC.
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Tabel 4.1 SIL Value for Whole SIF 
 
 
 
4.2         Independent Protection Layer (IPL) Analysis 
 
Independent Protection Layer serves to coat the plant in case of a disaster in the hope of the risk reduction that is 
large enough to prevent a failure that does not affect the plant, this layer independent saloing not related to one another. In 
connection with the  opinion of the experts and  IEC  standards are  now  saying that  the  ESD  system with  human 
intervention can not be used as the main security system, meaning that the system should only be an additional security 
system that would mem back up the main SIS system when failure occurs. 
But what happened in the PT Arun, because it still uses the old standard so that the security system ESD / SIS 
there are still using the system by a factor of human intervention as the main security system that should strongly 
discouraged by the IEC. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 IPL Overview 
 
In the figure 4.7 is an overview of Layer Protection owned by PT Arun, shows that in the third layer it shall be 
filled by the SIS / ESD automatic device but is occupied by the ESD system operator action that should go into the second 
layer together with the alarm. Thus meaning Layer Of Protection owned by PT ARUN less safe because of the lack of 
layer SIS and SIS should fill the layer with ESD -Operator Action, the average plant now uses an automated system 
terintegerasi as SIS. 
 
4.3         Design Result SIS – LOPA Method 
 
Lopa method used to determine the value of IPL is required as a protective layered on the plant in the event of 
failure, the method used by the results of HAZOP. Through the results of HAZOP after the group several conditions on 
each unit then divides into several categories for inclusion in the IPL, the result of Lopa found on some table, having 
formed a few tables and grouped and categorizing based on the hazard contained in the table and methods to mitigate 
them formed. Through methods Lopa get the results in the form of a layered IPL as in figure 4.2.
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Gambar 4.2 Tabel Layer IPL from  LOPA Result 
 
 
 
Gambar 4.3 Description of IPL Layer from figure 4.1 
 
 
 
4.3 SIS Conceptual Design 
 
Based on some of the stages that have been analyzed and own the results, then the last step is the design desari of 
the new SIS. Previous new SIS should have a value of SIL 3 unlike previous SIL value is only worth SIL 1, it can be done 
by adjusting the architecture used to achieve SIL 3, in general, SIL 3 2OO3 architecture. SIS conceptual design took a 
whole the conclusions of the methods methods that have been implemented, at this stage the SIS must be able to 
withstand the strongest possible hazard situation so as not to penetrate into the category of mitigation, eaning safe state 
condition can still be taken over. Unit 68 SIS design to form P & ID, can be seen from Figure 4.3 below.
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Figure 4.4 New P&ID Design
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On input into the loading pump are architecture that meets SIL3 value is 2OO3D, consisting of PT-6801, PT- 
6802, FE-6803, the three main sensor becomes sensing elements for detecting the occurrence of extreme values, in case 
the value of the two extremes of the current sensor The new active will be able to activate the valve to close. For the valve 
itself, there are two input valve before and after the location of the sensor layout yaiut sensor are valve-68001 and XSV 
XSV-68002, uses two final element aims to better secure the system feared one final element failed. For the Loading Arm, 
is a very important part as described previously, loading arm aimed to transfer LNG into tankers, on the unit system used 
2OO3D with the diagnosis, there is a sensor FE-6701 contained two and made a loop with the aim of comparison of the 
two sensors in the two areas can be taken into consideration accuracy, there are two other PI-6703/2 as feared in this area, 
the pressure will rise jumped two sensors is used as a safety. For the final element placed on two inputs and XSV XSV- 
60011-60 012 as security will close the track when danger occurs. Next is the design of Logic Solver for 3OO2D the SIS 
system storage tank section, shown in the figure 4.3 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Logic Solver Configuration 
 
In the picture above at the time of the testing of the system via the SIS logic solver is showing SIS system will be 
activated by closing some valves simultaneously and isolate one part of that failure does not spread to other systems. In 
the configuration of SIF-1 shows the system input into the LNG storage tank will be active if two sensors are activated at 
the same time and close the two valve input into the storage tank. SIF-2 configuration process with the same system that 
shows 3OO2 input via level sensors, and two pressure as comparison untuke ensure extreme conditions occur, and 
through testing appears also that the SIF-2 system will be active when both these sensors provide input. Through the 
system configuration, the SIS was formed with the architecture used for SIL3 and provide appropriate security used for 
LNG processing industry and it follows the latest standards specified by the IEC. 
 
5.           Final 
 
5.1         Conclusion 
 
Based on observations and analysis, the conclusions that can be drawn from the Analysis & Verification SIS SIS 
Unit Design Unit 60-68 and 60-68 are as follows. 
• System SIS longer have to follow the architectural design standard IEC 1974 simple so that the problem of cost is 
cheaper than a new system that uses many instruments and diverse architecture, this makes it more expensive in matters of 
cost, SIL is to build a very high and plant safety requires a very large cost, but comparable to the security offered. 
• SIL value from existing SIS PT ARUN is currently very small and not in accordance with the standards of the 
IEC for the LNG industry should be worth SIL3. While the new SIS was designed to have value SIL3 with a failure rate that 
is still the default by the vendor, the average system architecture in accordance with arssitektur to SIL3 is 2OO3D 
• IPL on using the old SIS SIS with operator interference as the primary safety system that should not be 
recommended to the new standards, but the design of the new SIS SIS separated operator with an automated system, the 
more layers the more it will be able to stem the hazard occurs when conditions. 
• In the long SIS Logic Solver incorporated with BPCS, and one unit logic solver mangambil over all the ESD 
system, for it is very dangerous in case of damage to the BPCS logic solver and then all three types of ESD will fail. In the 
new system there are 3 SIS Logic Solver separated apart from each SIS and BPCS, this reduces the risk of damage to the 
unit when it is still two units Logic Solver which takes over, more safety and risk more suppressed.
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5.2         Advice 
 
From this thesis, there are some suggestions for better future development, namely: 
• At this final project researchers conduct research and analysis and design using only instrument engineer standpoint, 
the next use several disciplines will be more detailed and effective. 
• At this final project researchers conduct research and analysis and design using only instrument engineer standpoint, 
the next use several disciplines will be more detailed and effective. 
• In designing HAZOP should be done several disciplines in order to more complete results from all sides. 
• Designing for SIS Logic Solver using PLC software more reliable advice from the author is Yokogawa Triconex 
software for Desai as more detailed and complete. 
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